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(Dist. Court No. 97-cv-01946) 
District Court Judge: Sylvia H. Rambo 
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Andrew J. Ostrowski (argued) 
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       D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General 
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       Attorney General 
       John G. Knorr, III, Chief Deputy 
        Attorney General (argued) 
       Office of Attorney General 
       Appellate Litigation Section 
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        Counsel for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this case, we must decide whether Congress validly 
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when 
it enacted provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. SS 2601-54, that require a broad 
class of employers, including states, to provide their 
employees with 12 weeks of leave "[b]ecause of a serious 
health condition that makes the employee unable to 
perform the functions of the position of such employee" and 
that permit employees to sue in federal court for violations 
of the Act. We agree with the District Court in this case and 
with the other Courts of Appeals that have considered this 
question that Congress did not validly abrogate the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted these 
provisions. See Hale v. Mann, No. 99-7326, 2000 WL 
675209, at *7 (2d Cir. May 25, 2000); Garrett v. University 
of Alabama at Birmingham Board of Trustees, 193 F.3d 
1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted on different 
issue, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000). We therefore affirm the 




On February 14, 1997, David D. Chittister, an employee 
of the Pennsylvania Department of Community and 
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Economic Development, requested sick leave. He was 
granted leave through May 2, 1997. For reasons not 
relevant to this appeal, approximately ten weeks later, on 
April 21, 1997, Chittister's leave was revoked, and he was 
fired. 
 
Chittister then filed this action in federal district court 
against the Department and two state officials. Chittister 
asserted a claim under the FMLA, alleging that the 
defendants had improperly denied him leave and hadfired 
him while he was on approved, paid sick leave. He also 
asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 on the ground that 
the defendants had retaliated against him for the exercise 
of his First Amendment rights. The District Court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants on Chittister's 
retaliation claim, and Chittister took a separate appeal from 
that order.1 A jury trial on the FMLA claim resulted in a 
verdict in Chittister's favor, but the District Court granted 
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Department, 
holding that Chittister's FMLA claim against the 
Department was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 




Under the Eleventh Amendment, a plaintiff other than 
the United States or a state may not sue a state in federal 
court without the latter state's consent unless Congress 
abrogates the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity 
pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress 
that power. See Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. 
Ct. 631, 643-44 (2000); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996). The Fourteenth Amendment confers 
such power, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976), 
but Article I of the Constitution does not. See Seminole 
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63-73. 
 
The FMLA requires an employer to provide "12 
workweeks of leave" 
 
        (A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We resolve that appeal, No. 99-3425, in a separate opinion. 
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       employee and in order to care for such son or 
       daughter. 
 
        (B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter 
       with the employee for adoption or foster care. 
 
        (C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, 
       daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, 
       son, daughter, or parent has a serious health 
       condition. 
 
        (D) Because of a serious health condition that makes 
       the employee unable to perform the functions of the 
       position of such employee. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 2612(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Act makes it 
unlawful for "any employer to interfere with, restrain, or 
deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right" 
provided under the Act. 29 U.S.C. S 2615(a)(1). The Act also 
grants state employees, among others, a private right of 
action against their employers for violations of the Act. See 
29 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(2)(A). As noted, Chittister sued his 
employer, the Pennsylvania Department of Community and 
Economic Development, alleging that the Department's 
"termination of [his] employment without granting [him] the 
leave to which he is entitled [was] a violation of the FMLA." 
Complaint at 5. 
 
It is not disputed that the Department is an arm of the 
Commonwealth and is within the protection of the Eleventh 
Amendment. Moreover, although Chittister argues 
otherwise, it is clear that Pennsylvania has not consented 
to suit under the FMLA. The Pennsylvania Constitution 
provides that the Commonwealth may be sued only"in 
such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the 
Legislature may by law direct." Pa. Const. art. I, S 11 
(emphasis added). The legislature has directed that the 
Commonwealth retains its sovereign immunity. See  1 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2310 (West Supp. 2000) ("[I]t is hereby 
declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the 
Commonwealth . . . shall continue to enjoy sovereign 
immunity and official immunity and remain immune from 
suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive 
the immunity."). It has waived immunity only for certain 
specified tort claims in suits for damages in state court. See 
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42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 8522. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has held that the Commonwealth's immunity 
is otherwise intact. See Dean v. Commonwealth , 751 A.2d 
1130, 1132 (Pa. 2000). The General Assembly has further 
provided that "[n]othing contained in this subchapter 
[including S 8522] shall be construed to waive the immunity 
of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts 
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States." S 8521(b). Thus, we have held that 
Pennsylvania has not consented to suit in federal court. See 
Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 141 F.3d 
88, 91 (3d Cir. 1998); Laskaris v. Thornburgh , 661 F.2d 23, 
25 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 
Chittister asserts that Pennsylvania consented to suit 
because an administrative policy "instructs the 
Commonwealth to post the notices required by the FMLA 
and its implementing regulations and specifically instructs 
the employees of their right to file suit to enforce its 
provisions." Appellant Br. at 29. However, waiver of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity is found only where the 
state "voluntarily invokes" federal jurisdiction or where the 
state "makes a clear declaration that it intends to submit 
itself" to federal jurisdiction. College Sav. Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 
2226 (1999) (quotation marks omitted). Because only a 
command of the General Assembly is sufficient under 
Pennsylvania law to waive the Commonwealth's immunity, 
an administrative policy cannot amount to a "clear 
declaration" that Pennsylvania intends to submit itself to 
federal jurisdiction. 
 
Chittister also asserts that Pennsylvania gave 
constructive consent to his suit by defending it on the 
merits and raising the issue of its immunity for thefirst 
time on appeal. It is settled, however, that Eleventh 
Amendment immunity may be raised for the first time on 
appeal even if the state defended the merits of the suit in 
the district court. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 
677-78 (1974); Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 141 F.3d at 91; 
College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 365 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Because 
the immunity issue sufficiently partakes of the nature of a 
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jurisdictional bar, it is an issue that may be raised any time 
during the pendency of the case. Merely because a state 
appears and offers defenses on the merits of the case, it 
does not automatically waive Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.") (citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, 
Chittister's contention that the Commonwealth consented 




Because the Commonwealth has not consented to suit, it 
may be sued in federal court only if Congress validly 
abrogated its Eleventh Amendment immunity. In order to 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress must 
make its intention to do so "unmistakably clear in the 
language of the statute." Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 640. The 
FMLA provides that "[a]ny employer who violates section 
2615 of this title shall be liable to any eligible employee 
affected for damages . . . ." 29 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(1)(A). The 
Act then grants a private right of action to eligible 
employees: "An action to recover damages or equitable relief 
. . . may be maintained against any employer (including a 
public agency) . . . by any one or more employees for and 
in behalf of the employees." See 29 U.S.C. S 2617(a)(2)(A) 
(emphasis added).2 
 
The language in the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act that provides for a private right of action is almost 
identical to the enforcement language in the FMLA. See 
29 U.S.C. S 216 (b) ("An action to recover the liability [under 
the ADEA] prescribed in either of the preceding sentences 
may be maintained against any employer (including a public 
agency) . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf 
of himself or themselves . . . .") (emphasis added). In Kimel, 
the Court held that this language in the ADEA represented 
an "unmistakably clear" attempt by Congress to abrogate 
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Kimel , 120 S. 
Ct. at 640. We therefore hold that the FMLA attempts to 
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The term "public agency" includes "the government of a State or 
political subdivision thereof" and "any agency of . . . a State, or a 
political subdivision of a State." 29 U.S.C.S 203(x). 
 




As noted, Congress has the authority to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. 
at 643-44. In order to invoke this, Congress "must identify 
conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's 
substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative 
scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct." Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. 
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1999). Here, Congress has 
identified the conduct transgressing the Fourteenth 
Amendment as "the potential for employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex" in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.3 29 U.S.C.S 2601(b)(4). In City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), the Court held that, in 
order for an exercise of Congress's enforcement power 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to be sustained,"[t]here 
must be a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted 
to that end." See id. at 2164. In the present case, 
consequently, there must be "congruence and 
proportionality" between "the potential for employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex" and the FMLA's 
provision of 12 weeks of leave to eligible employees. 
 
It is apparent that this standard cannot be met here. In 
enacting the FMLA, Congress found, among other things, 
that it is "important . . . that fathers and mothers be able 
to participate in early childrearing and the care of family 
members who have serious health conditions," 29 U.S.C. 
S 2601(a)(2), that the "lack of employment policies to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Chittister asserts that the abrogation of Pennsylvania's immunity is a 
valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the guarantees of 
substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Florida 
Prepaid, the Court refused to entertain an alternative basis for the 
legislation in question there because "Congress was so explicit about 
invoking its authority under Article I and its authority . . . under the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 119 S. Ct. at 2208 n.7. In enacting the FMLA, Congress explicitly 
relied on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
29 U.S.C. S 2601(b)(4). We, therefore, decline to consider the Due Process 
Clause as an alternative basis for the FMLA. 
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accommodate working parents can force individuals to 
choose between job security and parenting," S 2601(a)(3), 
that "there is inadequate job security" for persons who 
might take medical leave, S 2601(a)(4), and that "the 
primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on 
women" and has a greater effect on their work than it does 
on men, S 2601(a)(5). Notably absent is anyfinding 
concerning the existence, much less the prevalence, in 
public employment of personal sick leave practices that 
amounted to intentional gender discrimination in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause. For example, Congress did 
not find that public employers refused to permit as much 
sick leave as the FMLA mandates with the intent of 
disadvantaging employees of one gender. (Indeed, it is 
doubtful that a practice of allowing less sick leave than the 
FMLA requires would even have a disparate impact on men 
and women.). Nor are we aware of any substantial evidence 
of such violations in the legislative record. 
 
Moreover, even if there were relevant findings or evidence, 
the FMLA provisions at issue here would not be congruent 
or proportional. Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, which 
the FMLA is said to enforce, the FMLA does much more 
than require nondiscriminatory sick leave practices; it 
creates a substantive entitlement to sick leave. This 
requirement is "disproportionate to any unconstitutional 
conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act." 
Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645. It is "so out of proportion to a 
supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be 
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, 
unconstitutional behavior." City of Boerne , 117 S. Ct. at 
2170. For these reasons, the legislative scheme cannot be 
said to be congruent or proportional to any identified 
constitutional harm, and it cannot be said to be tailored to 
preventing any such harm. Accordingly, we hold that the 
FMLA provisions at issue here do not represent a valid 
exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment and that the FMLA does not abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. Cf. Lavia v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections, No. 99-3863 (3d 
Cir., filed Aug. 8, 2000) (Title I of ADA). 
 




For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District 
Court is affirmed. 
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